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Abstract This paper presents a “CPN/B method” based pro-
cess for railway systems safety analysis. Achieving interoper-
ability through the European Rail Traffic Management
System (ERTMS/ETCS) is facing difficulties in railway safety
assessment due to the interaction of national and European
operating specifications. These specifications have been
modeled using several formalisms, which makes it is extreme-
ly hard to preserve all requirements when switching between
different formalisms. However, this problem, crucial for effi-
cient progress in railway safety research, has received very
little attention in the literature. In this respect, the purpose of
this contribution is to provide a methodology to demonstrate
safety in railway systems by converting CPN models, widely
used inmodeling, into B abstract machines. It aims at enabling
a stronger combination of formal design techniques and anal-
ysis tools able to cope with the real complexity of systems and
automatically prove that safety properties are unambiguous,
consistent and not contradictory, considering an industrial rail-
way context.
Keywords Colored Petri nets . Bmethod . Transformation
methodology . Railway safety . ERTMS
1 Introduction
Today, Europe has more than twenty signaling and train con-
trol systems for railway transport that are different in terms of
performance and safety. Therefore, rail interoperability in
Europe requires a gradual transition to a common system for
the various member states, the European Rail Traffic
Management System (ERTMS/ETCS).
Performing railway interoperability allowed by ERTMS
requires a common understanding of requirements by all in-
volved parties. In this context, formal rigorous models are
effective tools to identify and clarify ambiguities. The
PERFECT (Performing Enhanced Rail Formal Engineering
Constraints Traceability) project is a French scientific project
that aims to formalize railway specifications and validate var-
ious systems. Systems’models will be developed and formal-
ly analyzed to determine, when possible, the compliance be-
tween ERTMS and National railway specifications. Our work
focuses on modeling of the functional and safety aspects of
railway systems (ERTMS, national rules, human factor…)
and their validation by the B formal method. Several studies
have been conducted in this context using formal methods and
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In this regard, the transportation technology and electrifi-
cation growing influence on performance and safety of sys-
tems operations, especially railways, requires from safety re-
search, such as PERFECT research, to address the more than
ever complex task of real scenario modeling. That is why
railway safety systems have been modeled using different
formalisms, such as Petri nets, UML and others [1–6], in order
to facilitate the expression of the know-how of industrial ex-
perts who may not be familiar with mathematical formalisms.
Yet, in order to link and analyze all railway models, B ma-
chines will constitute a common destination point that allows
us to arrive at rigorous conclusions. One of the ultimate goals
of this study is to provide a conversion methodology capable
of giving B abstract machine which behave exactly like
Colored Petri Nets models, and, therefore, ensure the preser-
vation of initial expert modeling and assessment.
This paper will present at first, High Level Petri Nets and
their interest in railway modeling. Afterwards, the B method
and its tools will be shown before presenting the core of this
contribution, which is a concrete translation method from
Colored Petri Nets to B abstract machines. As the purpose of
this work is to introduce the transformation framework and the
way it could be used within safety rules validation processes,
the next sections will detail, on the one hand, a simple railway
case study in which Petri nets are used in modeling before
their transformation to B abstract machines and safety analy-
sis, and on the other hand, describe how addressing an
ERTMS RBC procedure could benefit from such a translation
methodology. Finally, last section sums up and shows some
interesting perspectives to this work.
2 High level Petri nets modeling
Petri Nets were developed in 1960–1962 by the Germanmath-
ematician and computer scientist Carl Adam Petri. They have
become famous thanks to the work of American researchers
who used them in the 1970s (MIT Project onMathematics and
Computation-MAC project).
These networks constitute a powerful tool for studying
a wide variety of discrete event systems. They are useful
for both static modeling through their structure and dy-
namic representation through their operating rules.
Therefore, they cannot only study the architecture of sys-
tems, but also their evolution and their reaction during the
simulation.
2.1 Place/transition Petri nets
A Petri Net is represented by a graph with two types of nodes:
places, represented graphically by circles, and transitions that
are represented by bars or boxes. Places and transitions are
connected by directed arcs: arcs can only link a place to a
transition or a transition to a place. A Petri Net is characterized
by its initial state called initial marking. Detailed explanation
is given in [7].
Using Place/transition Petri Nets to model big complex
systems, such as railway systems, is very limited, due to the
size and complexity of the obtained models. For this reason, it
is necessary to use High-Level Petri Nets.
2.2 High level Petri nets: Colored Petri nets
In elementary Petri Nets, tokens cannot be distinguished.
However, modeling real complex systems requires the possi-
bility of transforming the nature of tokens through a transition.
Thereby, a new type of Petri Nets handling tokens transforma-
tion and labeled by a first-order language was born, called
High-Level Petri Nets. The first interesting class of High
Level Petri Nets was the “predicate/transition” nets developed
byHartmannGenrich [8]. The next step forward was achieved
by the development of Algebraic Petri Nets [9], and later the
development of Colored Petri Nets introduced by Kurt Jensen
[10]. In the PERFECT project, Colored Petri Nets are consid-
ered rather than the other High-Level Petri Nets forms espe-
cially for their bigger modeling power in the case of complex
railway systems.
Colored Petri Nets are an extension of Petri Nets based
on a functional language where the notion of typing is
fundamental. They allow the association with a value
named color to differentiate tokens. Color of tokens can
be transformed or tested during their passage in arcs and
transitions. The formal definition of a Colored Petri Net is
given below [10].
Definition 1A Colored Petri Net is a tuple CPN = (Σ, P, T, A,
N,C,G, E, I) satisfying the following requirements:
(i) Σ is a finite set of non-empty types, called colour sets.
(ii) P is a finite set of places.
(iii) T is a finite set of transitions.
(iv) A is a finite set of arcs such that: P∩ T = P∩ A = T∩
A =Ø.
(v) N is a node function. It is defined fromA intoP × T ∪ T ×
P.
(vi) C is a colour function. It is defined from P into Σ.
(vii) G is a guard function. It is defined from T into expres-
sions such that: ∀t ϵ T : [Type (G(t)) = Bool ∧
Type (Var (G(t))) ⊆ Σ].
(viii) E is an arc expression function. It is defined from A
into expressions such that:
∀a ϵ A : Type E að Þð Þ ¼ C p að Þð ÞMS∧ Type Var E að Þð Þð Þ⊆Σ
 
Where p(a) is the place of N(a).
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(ix) I is an initialization function. It is defined from P into
closed expressions such that:
∀p ϵ P : Type I pð Þð Þ ¼ C pð ÞMS
 
:
To havemore details on the above definition, the reader can
refer to [10].
In this context some typical cases are modeled using the
CPN-tools software platform. The main architects behind the
tool are Kurt Jensen, Soren Christensen, Lars M. Kristensen,
and Michael Westergaard [11, 12]. This platform combines
Petri Nets with the functional programming language
Standard ML. Standard ML provides the possibilities of de-
fining data types and describing data manipulation. This soft-
ware has been adopted by the PERFECT project, especially
for its extensive use in the previous contribution works in rail
systems assessment [13], and for its perfect match with
Colored Petri Nets requirements. A parallel modeling work
within PERFECT, using this tool, is focused on railway sce-
nario CPN modeling including infrastructure, regulation,
interlocking and human factors. Safety properties within these
models are intended to be verified using the methodology of
the present paper. Figure 1 illustrates an example of a Colored
Petri Net model for a simple railwaymovement from one track
circuit to the next.
Later in this paper, an academic railway example of trains’
safe movements is introduced and modeled using the CPN-
tool. Then, simulating the exact coherence between the CPN
model and the obtained B abstract machine will be shown.
3 B method and tools
The B method is a formal method for developing secure soft-
ware. It was designed by Jean-Raymond Abrial [14]. The B
method provides a formal specification and rigorous analysis
of the functionality and behavior of a system. It covers all
phases of the life cycle of software development from speci-
fication to implementation. Industrial applications of the B
method are mainly destined to rail systems, including the
commissioning of the metro line 14 (METEOR, 1998) and
the automation of line 1 (2005) by the RATP and other devel-
opments autopilots subways.
The development of a B method project has two interrelat-
ed activities: writing formal texts and the proof of these texts.
It is based on first-order logic mathematical notations and set
theory where the system state is modeled by abstract types of
preset data. It allows the modeling of static and dynamic as-
pects of structured software in abstract machines. The static
aspect is characterized by sets, constants, properties, var-
iables and constants, while the dynamic aspect is de-
scribed by the initialization and operations. In a specifi-
cation based on the model concept, the state of the
modeled system is described by the set of pairs (predi-
cate/expressions) where all predicates model the static as-
pect of the system. Description of state changes models
the dynamic aspect. These state changes are described
using three characteristic features:
& Pre-condition: defined by the set of states from which the
state change is possible.
& Operation: consists of the list of changes made to the pairs
(predicate expression).
& Post-condition characterizes acceptable statements as re-
sults of change.
Sometimes, in the formalism of the method B, the notion of
“substitution” replaces the concepts of pre-and post-condition.
3.1 Mathematical notation and B abstract machines
Data modeling and their properties, with the B language based
on mathematical notation, is essentially based on theory of
sets. Nevertheless, the B theory of sets includes the notion of
typing. In other words, all the elements of a set have the same
type. B properties are expressed by formulas of first order
predicate calculus. That is to say, in addition to the predicates
constructed with conventional propositional operators (and
(∧) or (∨) ...), there is equality and predicates composed of


















Fig. 1 Petri net model for a simple railway movement
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The B method is based on the notion of abstract machines.
These abstract machines can be associated to imperative pro-
graming, which describes the operations in terms of sequences
of elementary instructions executed to change the program
state. Each machine declares its own variables and operations
and variables can only be changed by the machine’s
operations.
The abstract machine models a system described by a set of
data or variables and operations that change their states.
Figure 2 shows a generic abstract machine.
In this paragraph, each clause of an abstract machine is
detailed:
MACHINE: Declaration of the name of the abstract ma-
chine and the formal parameter list (sets or values).
CONSTRAINTS: Declaration of logical properties of
parameters (sets or values) of the machine.
SETS: Declaration of the definitions of machine’s ab-
stract or listed sets.
CONSTANTS: Declaration of identifiers of constants.
PROPERTIES: Declaration of logical properties of sets
and constants declared with typing and evaluation of
constants.
VARIABLES: Declaration of identifiers of variables.
INVARIANT: Declaration of the invariant logical prop-
erties of variables declared with typing of variables.
ASSERTIONS: Declaration of definitions of the ma-
chine’s new logical assertions.
INITIALISATION: Declaration of the generalized sub-
stitution initializing the machine variables.
OPERATIONS: Declaration of machine operations in
the form of a header and a body.
END: End of the machine definition.
3.2 “ProB” and “Atelier B” tools
One interesting point of this study is the use of automatic
proof and check tools of the B method, especially to visualize
the behavior of B abstract machines and check safety proper-
ties of the modeled railway problem. The tools used in this
context are ProB1 animator and model checker1, added to the
“Atelier B”2 prover. ProB is an animator and model checker
for the B-Method that allows fully automatic animation of
many B specifications, and can be used to systematically
check a specification for a range of errors. The constraint-
solving capabilities of ProB can also be used for model find-
ing, deadlock checking and test-case generation. ProB is now
being used within Siemens, Alstom, and several other compa-
nies for data validation of complicated properties.
Model checking within ProB does the verification of a
system model with respect to the properties that are expected
on this model. The result of this analysis is the confirmation
that each property is, or is not, maintained by the model. In the
latter case, and this is one of the main interests of this tool, the
model checker returns a counter-example of how the property
is not maintained.
Otherwise, developed by Clearsy, “Atelier B” is an
industrial tool that allows for the operational use of the
B Method to develop defect-free proven software. It is
used to develop safety automatisms for the various sub-
ways installed throughout the world by Alstom and
Siemens, and also for Common Criteria certification
and the development of system models by ATMEL
and STMicroelectronics. Additionally, it has been used
in a number of other sectors, such as the automotive
industry, to model operational principles for the onboard
electronics of three car models.
Atelier B provides a theorem prover for the B models.
Unlike model checking, theorem provers are not based on
finite and decidable systems. They are mostly less simple to
use than the model checker but used to address various prob-
lems where, for example, the model checker cannot be used.
They allow us to bring proof of correctness of the program or


























Fig. 2 Generic B abstract machine
1 http://www.stups.uni-duesseldorf.de/ProB/index.php5/Download
2 http://www.atelierb.eu/telecharger-latelier-b/
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Accordingly, these two tools are complementary where the
use of ProB suits better in the early conception phases, espe-
cially for a fast error debug, and the use of Atelier B comes
later to give the proof of properties correctness. Therefore, the
use of both of these tools reinforces the conclusions of the
work presented in this paper.
4 Description of the transformation methodology
This section describes the proposed conversion algorithm
to translate CPN models to B abstract machines. First of
all, a general survey of previous contributions will be
presented to point out the difficulties and limitations of
the establishment of a complete and applicable transfor-
mation method. Then, the translation approach consists in
defining, firstly, the transformation rules of a CPN’s ge-
neric structural properties. Yet, the conversion of CPN
model to B language will be complemented by the inte-
gration of the behavioral specification and dynamic
properties.
4.1 Known transformation approaches and literature
survey
According to [15], formalism transformation could be done
under three main approaches: mapping approach, pivot
approach and the layered approach. Mapping approach
states that for each pair of formalisms a mapping is created
which transforms expressions in the source formalism to ex-
pressions in the target formalism. It can be well adapted to the
two specific formalisms and, therefore, involves the smallest
loss of information. Concerning the pivot approach, transfor-
mation between two different formalisms is done via a chosen
formalism called the pivot. The pivot formalism must be
very expressive to avoid losing information in the trans-
formation, especially if the system involves formalisms
that are unlike each other. A pivot approach was conduct-
ed in [16] for Petri net transformation into DEVS formal-
ism. However this method concerns only elementary
place/transition nets because of their small amount of in-
formation. The layered approach uses a layered architec-
ture containing languages with increasing expressiveness.
This approach has been proposed in order to avoid using a
very expressive language and to ensure tractable reason-
ing with the integrated languages. In such a layered archi-
tecture, representations can be translated into languages
higher in the hierarchy without loss of information.
The method proposed in this paper is based on informed
transformation [17], which is in accordance with the mapping
approach in the scope of Model Driven Engineering [18].
Informed transformation stipulates that a mapping of the
source formal description of a formalism to the target one
exists. The transformation between formalisms uses this for-
mal description and the mapping between them. Within
Model Driven Engineering, input Petri net models conform
to the metamodel presented in [19], which is based on
Jensen’s formal definition.
A recent previous work with the same goal and using a
mapping approach is presented by BON.P in [20]. However,
that conversion method was tested and it was found that the
resulting machines are not accepted by the B tools due to the
use of a large amount of definitions, added to their unpractical
heaviness. Indeed, this method tries to define both the struc-
tural and behavioral properties of CPNs thanks to heavy def-
initions, and copes with these CPN modeling as a rigid
graphical formalism. Consequently, the obtained ma-
chines are very hard to express or simulate and cannot
be verified using B tools.
Another recent and important work to refer to is the work
presented in [21], where a very close issue was considered, but
this time for a mapping from Place/Transition Petri Nets to the
B-language. This work constitutes a simplified version of the
author’s original mapping form Evaluative Petri Nets to B
machines. However this paper’s mapping does not cover
Colored Petri Nets, the ideas presented are significantly inter-
esting for our transformation framework in order to provide a
future formal description of the present methodology.
Therefore, this paper presents and describes the frame-
work of a new transformation method, based on a deeper
analysis of the functioning and the handling of Colored
Petri Nets with special focus on their component tasks.
One of the basic starting principles is the ability of apply-
ing the method to a complete safety study case, as it is
presented in this paper. The methodology is also likely to
lead to an elaborate formal description of the transforma-
tion and open to undergo improvements. Furthermore, this
new method intends to provide a transformation able to be
encoded in order to develop an interactive software plat-
form for automatic CPN conversion into B abstract ma-
chines. So, this work describes in detail the principles of
the transformation and its application and will constitute
the base framework for the establishment of formal repre-
sentations and proof of the transformation.
The next sections detail the transformation theory,
starting with basic Multisets definition, structural proper-
ties transformation rules, and finally, the description of
CPN behavioral characteristics transformation according
to the spirit of the B method. Afterward, the B machines
behavior equivalence to the original CPN models is dem-
onstrated, which constitute a first step toward a formal
proof of the correctness of the method. The simulation
of a typical railway example, which validates the syntax
acceptance, supports this transformation framework and
visualizes the exact matching of the machine’s behavior
and proves the safety invariant conservation.
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4.2 Multisets definition
Amultiset is specified as a relationship between the base set of
the multiset and natural numbers. As in [8, 13], the elements
of a multiset are pairs (ee ↦ nn) where ee is a member of the
base set and nn is an integer which represents the coefficient
(number of occurrences) of the element in the multiset.
Ms (ss) is a multiset based on ss defined as a total function
from ss to all natural numbers:
Ms ssð Þ¼¼ss→NAT :
The empty multiset, based on ss, is composed of pairs of
elements of the support set related to 0. Thus, it is a total
function, which for each element of the starting set combines
the integer 0:
Ms empty ssð Þ ¼¼ elt j elt : ss 0f gf g
This work uses only these two Multiset definitions
that will appear in all the machines obtained for each
Petri net color. The following sections will detail the
transformation rules.
4.3 Petri net structure transformation rules
For several reasons of formalization as the transformation and
its automation, the construction of the transformation rules
was based on Jensen’s formal definition of Colored Petri
Nets. For each point of the formal definition of Petri Net
structure, an associated transformation rule is then given.
The following paragraph details these rules.
(i)Σ is a finite set of non-empty types, called colour sets.
A set of the abstract machine is associated to each
color of Σ. If the color is described by an enumerated
set, it matches to an enumerated set in the clause
“SETS” of the abstract machine B. Regarding non-
enumerated sets; they correspond to definitions of the
clause “DEFINITIONS” as shown in Fig. 3.
(ii) P is a finite set of places. (iii) T is a finite set of
transitions. (iv) A is a finite set of arcs such
that: P∩ T = P∩A = T∩A =Ø. (v) N is a node func-
tion. It is defined from A into P × T ∪ T × P. (vi) C is a
colour function. It is defined from P intoΣ.
The places of the set P are defined by their identifier and
their state (marking). Therefore, they are translated by the
variables state_Idplace. Places are also defined by their type
color. This invariant property will be translated by the invari-
ant state_Idplace ϵ Ms. (color) in the “INVARIANT” clause
(Fig. 4).
A transition is defined by its identifier as well as its state
(enabled or non-enabled). The structure of a transition is trans-
lated into a Boolean variable that expresses the transition’s
state. Of course, the name of the variable describes the iden-
tifier, and the invariant in B describes the type. Elements of
transition guard are handled in the section describing Petri Net
behavior transformation (Fig. 5).
Note:Arcs do not explicitly appear in the abstract machine.
In fact, the goal of the translation is to provide a B abstract
machine behaving exactly as the considered Petri Net. For this
reason, arcs are analyzed through their function in a Petri Net
which is to ensure the logical evolution of states, using expres-
sions of arcs. Therefore, the information of arcs is not lost in
the transformation process, but it will appear in the dynamic
part of the machine which is covered in the section describing
the behavioral transformation of a Colored Petri Net.
(ix) I is an initialization function. It is defined
f r om P i n t o c l o s e d e x p r e s s i o n s s u c h
that:∀p ϵ P : [Type (I(p)) = C(p)MS].
The initial marking of each site is assigned to the
INITIALISATION clause as is shown in Fig. 6.
Elt_color is an element of the set color and n is a natural
number which expresses the occurrence of the token, accord-
ing to the previous definition of the multisetMs_empty.
N o t e : T h e c l a u s e s “VA R I A B L E S ” a n d
“INITIALISATION” will also include the declaration and
Fig. 3 Colours B translation
Fig. 4 Places B translation
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the initialization of variables of type “NATURAL” describing
the occurrence of each token color of a given place, denoted
occ_eltcolor_idplace. These variables represent only the state
of the places (marking) of the Petri Net. They will mainly
allow expression properties invariants and help the machines
automatic proof of the Atelier B.
4.4 Petri net behavior transformation rules
The behavior of a Petri Net corresponds to the evolution of its
places states (markings). This evolution is governed by the
crossing of enabled transitions, following the instructions of
expressions of arcs and guards.
Of course, a transition is enabled if and only if all incoming
places (with incoming arcs) have a number of tokens with the
type indicated on the incoming arcs and if the predicate of the
guard is true. The definition of a transition state (enabled or
non-enabled) wil l be translated by an operat ion
Op_Enabled_Idtransion. This will aim to change the
Boolean variable describing the state of the transition
Enabled_Idtransion. Regarding transition crossing (firing),
it consists in transforming the states of adjacent places, ac-
cording to the guidelines of the guard and outgoing arcs to
outgoing places, and subtracting consumed tokens in incom-
ing places. Crossing a transition will be translated by a second
operation Op_Fired_Idtransion.
Note: The behavioral transformation is characterized by
the introduction of two operations for each transition, when
the use of only one operation (op_Fired_Idtransition) might
be absolutely sufficient in most cases. The main idea behind
the operation Op_Enabled_Idtransion is to leave open the
use of the Boolean variables enabled_Idtransition in ex-
pressing safety invariants related to transition or events.
In fact, sometimes, it is difficult to establish invariants
using variables corresponding to places or tokens. If the
transformation is used in critical software development for
example, this operation could be omitted or removed in
the refinement phases.
Therefore, the evolution of Colored Petri Nets will be
translated into B through operations in the kind of substi-
tutions with precondition “PRE” and “SELECT” substi-
tutions that will represent the evolution of places and
transitions states which are already declared as variables.
The use of “SELECT” in the op_Fired_Idtransition is
justified by the fact that the firing of the transition may
involve different tokens (colors) choices according to the
elements of the “color set” related to the incoming and
outgoing places (all tokens in those places are necessarily
one of these elements, i.e. token ϵ X where X ϵ Σ).
(vii) G is a guard function. It is defined from T into
expressions such that: ∀ t ϵ T : [Type (G(t)) =Bool ∧
Type (Var (G(t))) ⊆ Σ]. (viii) E is an arc expression
function. It is defined from A into expressions such
tha t : ∀a ϵ A : [Type (E (a ) ) = C (p (a ) )MS ∧
Type(Var (E(a))) ⊆ Σ] where p(a) is the place of N(a).
The predicate part of the guard expressions and incoming
arcs expressions will be translated by a predicate in the PRE
section of the substitution with precondition in the operation
Op_Enabled_Idtransion. The THEN section will include the
action on Boolean variable Enabled_Idtransion:=TRUE
(Fig. 7).
On the other hand, the guard may also have an action part.
Expressions of outgoing arcs can be considered as actions as
well. These actions (guards and outgoing arcs) aim to change
the state of outgoing places, thus changing the state of the
corresponding variables in B abstract machine, and possibly
other variables according to the Petri Net. They will be trans-
lated in the “THEN” section of the substitution with selection
in Op_Fired_Idtransion operation. The change of variables
corresponding to states of places is done by an overload in the
B machine. This part will always contain the substitution
Op _E n a b l e d _ I d t r a n s i o n : = FAL SE s o t h a t
Op_Enabled_Idtransion operation is no longer enabled.
The “SELECT” (and WHEN) part of this second operation
w i l l i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w i n g p r e d i c a t e :
Enabled_Idtransion = TRUE & Predicate_P. the
Predicate_P gives an indication of the selected token and
the decrement condition of occurrences variables (Fig. 8).
At this point, the Colored Petri Net conversion meth-
odology into B abstract machines was described. The fol-
lowing sections will emphasizes the behavioral equiva-






Fig. 5 Transitions B translation
INITIALISATION
State_Idplace:= Ms_empty(color) <+ {(elt_color |-> n),...}
Fig. 6 Initial marking translation
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machines, before showing the use of this method through
an academic railway example.
Note: the predicates in the obtained B machine could be
enriched in order to facilitate the proving task without affect-
ing the behavior of the machines or the quality of the
transformation.
4.5 Behavioral equivalence
According to Jensen’s formal definition of the behavior of a
Colored Petri Net:
(1) A transition is enabled ⇔ there are enough tokens of
the correct values specified on arcs on each input-
place and the guard evaluates to true.
(2) When a transition is fired ⇔ a multi-set of tokens is
removed from each input-place and a multi-set of
tokens is added to each output-place.
To ensure that the transformation keeps the elements of the
initial model, these two basic equivalences have to be verified
in terms of their element’s corresponding components in the B
abstract machine:
(1) An operation Op_Enabled_Idtransion is enabled ⇔ the
predicate of the clause PRE in Op_Enabled_Idtransion
is true.
(2) An operation Op_Fired_Idtransion is executed ⇔ the
s u b s t i t u t i o n i n t h e c l a u s e T H E N i n
Op_Fired_Idtransion contains a multisets overload
and is executed.
The demonstration of these two equivalences, presented
hereafter, is direct and can be done using the basic B abstract
machine definitions. In this work part of the PERFECT pro-
ject, such a demonstration supports the correctness of the
transformation and provides materials for the construction of
its formal proof.
Demonstration 1 For the first equivalence, let us suppose
that: An operation Op_Enabled_Idtransion is enabled and
let us prove that the predicate of the clause PRE in
Op_Enabled_Idtransion is true (direct implying): by con-
struction, the substitutions with precondition operation (con-
taining “PRE” and “THEN”) is enabled if and only if the
substitution after PRE is true. So, the predicate of the clause
PRE in Op_Enabled_Idtransion is true.
Let us suppose now that the predicate of the clause PRE in
Op_Enabled_Idtransion is true and let us prove that the op-
eration Op_Enabled_Idtransion is enabled (reverse imply-
ing): since the predicate of the operation clause PRE is true,
the THEN substitution can be executed, and that means, by
construction, that the operation Op_Enabled_Idtransion is
enabled.
Demonstration 2 For the second equivalence, let us suppose
that: an operationOp_Fired_Idtransion is executed and let us
prove that the substitution in the clause THEN in
Op_Fired_Idtransion contains a multisets overload and is
executed (direct implying): the transformation method
specifies that the change of variables corresponding to
states of places is done by an overload in the B machine.
So this implication is proved directly.
Let us suppose now that the substitution in the clause
THEN inOp_Fired_Idtransion contains a multisets overload
and is executed and let us prove that operat ion
Op_Fired_Idtransion is executed (reverse implying): by def-
inition, an operation is executed if and only if the THEN
substitution of this operation is executed. Therefore, this im-
plication is directly proved.
5 Railway study case
As well as the rigorous construction of the transformation
from CPNs to B machines in the context of railway safety,
Fig. 9 Schematic representation of the study case
Op_Fired_Idtransition= 
SELECT Enabled_idtransition= TRUE & Predicate1
THEN Substituions 1




Fig. 8 Firing transition translation
Op_Enabled_Idtransition= 
PRE Predicate
THEN Enabled_idtransition:= TRUE 
END
Fig. 7 Enabled transition Operation in the B machine
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its applicability of the validation process is crucial and ex-
tremely important, especially for the PERFECT project results
requirements. That is why, in parallel to the development
of an elaborate and formal transformation, based on the
framework presented here and comprising the descrip-

























































































occ_ta_0, occ_ta_1, occ_ta_2,occ_ta_3, occ_ta_4, 
occ_ta_5,occ_ta_6,
occ_tb_0, occ_tb_1, occ_tb_2,occ_tb_3, occ_tb_4, 
occ_tb_5,occ_tb_6,







occ_ta_0:NATURAL & occ_ta_1:NATURAL & occ_ta_2:NATURAL & 
occ_ta_3:NATURAL & occ_ta_4:NATURAL & 
occ_ta_5:NATURAL & occ_ta_6:NATURAL &
occ_tb_0:NATURAL & occ_tb_1:NATURAL & occ_tb_2:NATURAL & 
occ_tb_3:NATURAL & occ_tb_4:NATURAL & 
occ_tb_5:NATURAL & occ_tb_6:NATURAL & 
occ_no_0:NATURAL & occ_no_1:NATURAL & occ_no_2:NATURAL & 
occ_no_3:NATURAL & occ_no_4:NATURAL & 
occ_no_5:NATURAL & occ_no_6:NATURAL &
enabled_from0to1 : BOOL & enabled_from1to2 : BOOL & 
enabled_from2to3 : BOOL &
enabled_from3to4 : BOOL & enabled_from4to5 : BOOL & 
enabled_from5to6 : BOOL &
enabled_from6to0 : BOOL &
state_0:Ms(train)& state_1:Ms(train)& state_2:Ms(train)& 
state_3:Ms(train)& state_4:Ms(train)& state_5:Ms(train)& 
state_6:Ms(train)
DEFINITIONS
Ms(ss)== ss --> NAT;
Ms_empty(ss)=={elt|elt : ss×{0}}
INITIALISATION
occ_ta_0:=1 || occ_ta_1:=0 || occ_ta_2:=0 || occ_ta_3:=0 
||occ_ta_4:=0 || occ_ta_5:=0 || occ_ta_6:=0 
||occ_tb_0:=0 || occ_tb_1:=0 || occ_tb_2:=0 || occ_tb_3:=0 
||occ_tb_4:=1 || occ_tb_5:=0 || occ_tb_6:=0
||occ_no_0:=0 || occ_no_1:=1 || occ_no_2:=1 || occ_no_3:=1 









Fig. 11 Extract of the first part of the obtained B machine
THEN state_0 := state_0 <+ {(tb |->(0)),(no |->(1))}
OPERATIONS
Op_Enabled_from0to1=
PRE ((ta |-> 1):state_0 or (tb |-> 1):state_0) & 
(no |-> 1):state_1 & (no |-> 1):state_2
THEN enabled_from0to1 := TRUE
END;
Op_Enabled_from1to2=
PRE ((ta |-> 1):state_1 or (tb |-> 1):state_1) & 




PRE ((ta |-> 1):state_2 or (tb |-> 1):state_2) &




PRE ((ta |-> 1):state_3 or (tb |-> 1):state_3) &




PRE ((ta |-> 1):state_4 or (tb |-> 1):state_4) & 




PRE ((ta |-> 1):state_5 or (tb |-> 1):state_5) & 




PRE ((ta |-> 1):state_6 or (tb |-> 1):state_6) & 




SELECT enabled_from0to1 = TRUE & (ta |-> 1):state_0 & 
occ_ta_0>=1 & occ_no_1>=1 
THEN state_0 := state_0 <+ {(ta |->(0)),(no |->(1))}
||state_1 := state_1 <+ {(ta |->(1)),(no |->(0))}
||enabled_from0to1:= FALSE
||occ_ta_0:=occ_ta_0-1 || occ_ta_1:=occ_ta_1+1 || 
occ_no_0:=occ_no_0+1 || occ_no_1:=occ_no_1-1
WHEN enabled_from0to1 = TRUE & (tb |-> 1):state_0 & 
occ_tb_0>=1 & occ_no_1>=1 
Fig. 12 Extract of the operation part of the obtained B machine
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small case studies figures in the work agenda. In this
section, a complete process is shown, from the Colored
Petri Net modeling step to the validation of safety prop-
erties by B machine analysis, which is applied to a
theoretical railway case study. The correctness of trans-
formation is also checked using “ProB” and “CPN-
tools” simulation tools.
5.1 Description of the railway case study
The studied example consists of a closed railway network
composed of seven elementary portions numbered 0 to 6 in-
cluding two trains ta and tb (Fig. 9). Train movements are
specified by the following general rules (constraints):
& C1: the network is composed of consecutive elementary
portions called track circuits (CdV).
& C2: trains run on that network in a given direction.
& The functioning of this e railway is governed by two other
safety rules:
& C’1: there cannot be two trains on the same track circuit.
& C’2: there must always be a free track circuit between two
trains.
5.2 Railway case study modeling using CPNs
The Colored Petri Net of the previous railway example is
presented in the following Fig. 10. Each track circuit is
modeled using a place of type “Train” where “Train” is a set
containing the tokens ta and tb, and the train movements are
represented by transitions.
Note that the initial marking is represented with the token
“ta” in the place “0”, “tb” in the place “4”. The other places
contain the token “no” which denotes the non-presence of a
train in the track circuit modeled by the place.
5.3 The obtained B abstract machine after transformation
Following the transformation rules defined earlier, a B abstract
machine is obtained for which the following Fig. 11 shows an
extract of declaration and initialization parts.
An extract of the operations part is illustrated in Fig. 12.
5.4 Simulation of the exact correspondence
between the obtained machine and the initial Petri net
Before the introduction of the safety invariants to validate and
achieve the purpose of this study, a first check of the obtained
B abstract machine is conducted by the “Atelier B” prover and
the ProB model checking and animation platform. The
“Atelier B” prover has generated 174 proof obligations
and has proved 174 one (a 100% rate). Furthermore, with
the prover, if we demonstrate that the system has a rate of
100%, the typing of the machine is then correct. The ProB
animation, added to this proof, will show that the ob-
tained machine behaves correctly like the Petri Net
model. For this purpose, this paper will compare the
evolution of state spaces of the CPN model and the B
machine for the same sequence of events.
At first, Fig. 13 illustrates the state space of CPN tools
describing the initial marking and its reachable states.
This state corresponds to the ProB state space of the ma-
chine after its initialization presented in Fig. 14.
At this stage, since the paper cannot present all states, only
the firing of the transition “move 0–1” et “move1–2”, giving
access to the state shown in Fig. 15. It is important to note that
this comparison is done only for support to the transformation
rules and demonstrations. A formal description and proof is to
be constructed within the project. However, this illustration
might help the reader to have a better understanding to the
transformation basic rules.
After this firing, the only enabled transition is “move 4–5”,
and the places “0”, “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “5” and “6” contain
respectively the tokens “no”, “no”, “ta”, “no”, “tb”, “no” and
“no”, as it is shown in Fig. 16 of CPN tools state space. The
following figure of ProB animator shows that the same state is
obtained after executing the operations corresponding to the
two transitions (Fig. 17).
The simulation continues using the ProB animator until all































Fig. 13 CPN tools state space for the initial marking
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obtained abstract machine behaves exactly like the trans-
formed Colored Petri Net and keeps all the modeled require-
ments, which is reinforcing our conclusions to use the trans-
formation rules presented in this paper as a base framework
for the construction of all the aspects of the transformation,
such as its formalization, formal proof and automation. Note
that in the industrial practice, the use of simulation tools and
small applications during the early phases of a project is very
important in order to ensure the right orientation of the efforts
while progressing.
5.5 Safety constraints validation by B tools
In the case study, two safety rules are to be proved by B
method tools: There cannot be two trains on the same track
circuit and there must always be a free track circuit between
two trains.
At first, it is necessary to express these safety rules by
an invariant predicate. An invariant predicate which guar-
antees at the same time that only one train occupies a
track circuit and that there is always a free track circuit
between two trains is:
occ ta 0þ occ tb 0þ occ ta 1þ occ tb 1 <¼ 1ð Þ&
occ ta 1þ occ tb 1þ occ ta 2þ occ tb 2 <¼ 1ð Þ&
occ ta 2þ occ tb 2þ occ ta 3þ occ tb 3 <¼ 1ð Þ&
occ ta 3þ occ tb 3þ occ ta 4þ occ tb 4 <¼ 1ð Þ&
occ ta 4þ occ tb 4þ occ ta 5þ occ tb 5 <¼ 1ð Þ&
occ ta 5þ occ tb 5þ occ ta 6þ occ tb 6 <¼ 1ð Þ&
occ ta 6þ occ tb 6þ occ ta 0þ occ tb 0 <¼ 1ð Þ
Thereby, the use of the model check of ProB which stops
when all operations are covered proves that this invariant is
respected by the abstract machine.
Fig. 14 ProB state space view at initialization


















































































Fig. 15 Petri net after firing Bmove0–1^ and ‘move1–2″ transitions














































Fig. 16 CPN tools state space
after firing Bmove0–1^ and
‘move1–2″ transitions
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“Atelier B” proof reached a rate of 100% after having added
the previous invariant and concretized the implicit conditions of
the B machine operations, such as completing the implicit con-
ditions expressed by “state_Idplace = Ms_empty(train)” with
the precondition “occ_eltcolor1_idplace =0 & … &
occ_eltcolorN_idplace=0”, which does not affect the behavior
of the obtained B machine.
6 An example of ERTMS case study –RBChandover
Of course, the present methodology has many possible appli-
cations the within development and verification processes in
train control systems such as ERTMS, mainly because of the
wide use of formal techniques in those environments,
especially state diagrams, which can easily be remodeled
using Petri Nets, and the B method. For example, one com-
mon procedure to be implemented by Radio Block Centers
Fig. 17 ProB state space view after operations execution
Fig. 18 RBC/RBC Handover
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(RBCs) is the Handover. In fact, the RBC Handover (HOV),
as described in Subset-039 [22], is about the communication
between two RBCs when a given train is changing its corre-
sponding RBC to the other (Fig. 18). This communication
consists of neighbor RBC (NRBC) messages as shown in
the following fig. [22].
In particular, the Subset-039 [22] details the states and
events of one RBC/RBC handover transaction using two pos-
sible states: “No RBC/RBC handover is in progress” and “An
RBC/RBC handover is on-going. The RBC has the role of
Handing over RBC”. For our study, we suggest the following
Petri Net model (Fig.19) as an equivalent to the state diagram
describing the transaction in the Subset.
The following table describes the various events involved
in the RBAC/RBC Handover transaction (Table 1).
One clear advantage of transforming the Petri Net model
describing the RBC Handover’s transaction is the ability to
use, without losing the logic of the process, the resulting B
machine in formally proving safety properties of a bigger train
operations model. Besides, such an bridge between the two for-
malisms could, in the case of ERTMS equipment development,












Request for RRI Confirmation received
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Fig. 19 Handing over RBC Petri
Net
Table 1 Incoming events of
Handing over RBC Event Description
HOV condition detected Handover condition detected
RRI request necessary Handing over RBC detects that route related information is
required from the accepting RBC
RRI received NRBC message BRoute Related Information^ received
Condition BBorder passed by safe
front end^ detected
Position report received and condition BBorder passed by
maximum safe front end^ detected
TOR received NRBC message BTaking Over Responsibility^ received
Condition BBorder passed by safe
rear end^ detected
Position report received and condition BBorder passed by
minimum safe rear end^ detected
Cancellation condition detected Condition for cancellation of the RBC/RBC handover
transaction is detected in the handing over RBC
ACK received NRBC message BAcknowledgement^ has been received
Cancellation received NRBC message BCancellation^ received
Life Sign received NRBC message BLife Sign^ received
Request for RRI Confirmation received NRBC message BRequest for RRI Confirmation^ received
RRI Confirmation condition detected RRI Confirmation condition detected
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7 Conclusion and perspectives
Under the project PERFECT (Performing Enhanced Rail
Formal Engineering Constraints Traceability), consistency be-
tween ERTMS specifications and national operating railway
rules is to be checked and validated using formal techniques.
In this context, researchers and experts model the railway
conduct and rules through different formalisms, such as
High-Level Petri Nets and UML. One of the biggest chal-
lenges of the project is to introduce validation methodologies
based on formal techniques and convert all the obtained
models to a common powerful formal tool able to link those
models and keep all their initial information.
In this respect, this work makes a significant step toward
the main goal of the project. It brings the base framework, of
Colored Petri Nets conversion into B abstract machines,
where behavioral equivalence of the two formalisms was
demonstrated. An illustrative case study was conducted to
show the application process of such a validation methodolo-
gy in the railway context using the tools of the B method.
Therefore, this contribution has several perspectives. One of
them is the establishment of an elaborate formal description of
the transformation base on the rules presented here and the de-
velopment of a software platform for its automation. Indeed, an
automatic conversion tool is very important to facilitate the gen-
eration of B abstract machines because it takes a very long time
to establish them manually, especially for large models. On the
other hand, this work leads to question on how it is possible to
link different B machines obtained from different input models,
and those established by means of diverse formalisms, such as
Petri Nets and UML in the case of the PERFECT project, with
the purpose of checking the consistency between ERTMS and
national railway specifications using the B tools [3, 4, 23]. This
will help the project to achieve its main goal and propose an
interesting background for railway safety scientific researches.
A further purpose of this work is to develop a complete auto-
matic railway safety rules validation tool.
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